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Abstract 
 
The ‘socio-legal’ has always been a vigorously contested space in International 
Law theory. The ‘legal’ has been consigned to near-irrelevance by realist 
international relations theory on the one hand, and lauded as a remarkable 
achievement of modernity on the other – a civilising enterprise aspiring to the 
preservation of peace by the State under the rule of law.  
 
The instrumental role of International Law in achieving the peace is now being re-
oriented by liberal institutionalists such as Anne Marie Slaughter. This theory 
postulates a regime of international, or at least transnational, law formulation 
through the interaction of networks of non-state actors such as domestic courts, 
regulatory agencies, executives, NGO’s and other discursive communities. There is 
a ‘thicker’, more diverse set of international relations which erodes the sovereignty 
of State from without and within. Globalisation can be characterised as a context 
and a vehicle for this new liberal-cosmopolitan project. The theory is not limited to 
procedural innovation, however, for it carries within it the specific telos of liberal 
internationalism, or in its strongest form a liberal millenarianism which aspires to 
something like a Kantian peace in an expanding zone of liberal law.  
 
If there is an ongoing tension in International Law theory between the theory and 
the practice then this new liberal institutionalist approach at least has the virtue of 
claiming to describe practice. However, its teleological claim must bear closer 
scrutiny from perspectives of both theory and practice. Is it really ‘new’ or just a 
light shone more brightly on old practices? Is there such a fundamental shift as to 
amount to a disaggregation of the State and an undermining of the centrality of the 
State in the global order? Do these networks represent something authentically 
‘liberal’ or are they merely opaque, unaccountable, self-selecting elites? Are they 
really just a kind of vulgar interest-group liberalism or do they represent an 
embryonic civil society? Finally, can or even should liberalism make any claim to 
a post-historical space that leaves the non-liberal world mired in ideological 
backwaters?    
 
‘Socio-legal currents in International Law Theory’ (Work in Progress) 
 
‘…the function of a theory is to formulate or guide practice; to provide a relatively 
abstract framework for the understanding and determination of action’1 
 
Introduction 
 
The ‘governance’ dilemma both within states and in the international order comes 
from the tension between the need for institutions and rules which can deliver 
collective benefits and the danger they pose to liberty.2 We need more government 
yet fear it. Thus in International Law the tension is between Sovereignty and 
Global Governance. The model of International Law / International Relations 
theorised by Anne-Marie Slaughter aspires to realize the benefits of cooperation 
within a regulatory framework that does not import an ‘oppressively coercive 
global authority’.3  
 
Realist images of International Law  
 
The post-1930’s Realist vision of international relations theory sees states as 
(overwhelmingly) the primary actors in international relations. They are 
characterised as egoistic (in that they are solely concerned with pursuing self-
interest), rational (pursuing maximum self-interest) and unitary (in manifesting a 
single directing mind). They are opaque (one cannot and need not look behind 
them) and functionally identical (equally endowed with aspects of international 
personality). International Law is seen as epiphenomenal, a mere by-product, and 
reflection of the power relations of dominant states. It ‘hovers’ above the 
international order but is not instrumental in behaviour. The theory is essentially 
empirical – ‘what happened’, not ‘what should have happened’; how the world 
really works not how it should. 
 
Note that although it claims that no moral justification is required to justify states’ 
behaviour, arguably the choice of interests upon which to base policy is a 
normative act reflecting a particular world view (e.g. Koskiennemi).4 Realism may 
be said to reflect the actual aggregated preferences of citizens in a utilitarian sense 
or alternatively in a communitarian sense of reflecting some deeply held values 
and beliefs that may or may not coincide with community preferences at a given 
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historical moment.5 (eg US action in Iraq is arguably infused with assumptions 
about liberal democracy; the overthrow of Allende in Chile was not). This 
argument echoes those of Constructivists, who say that each state embodies a set of 
values and identity which is prior to the formulation of its interests, that is to say 
state actors are constituted by deep norms which are a product of their history, 
culture and circumstances. For example, the United States can be seen as 
embodying notions of popular sovereignty – of power emanating from, and 
legitimised by, its people, and not (for example) from foreign institutions. Hence 
its predilection  for unilateralism (when it can get away with it). The point is that a 
more reflective view of Realism suggests that state actions themselves are 
motivated by, and infused with, ideology and normative content so that hegemonic 
liberal democratic states, for example, will inevitably export those values through 
their actions. Others see an ‘idealist’ strain in Realism’s support for the intrinsic 
value of sovereignty, or more specifically of self-determination.6 But such actions 
may nonetheless produce immoral outcomes, such as human rights violations in 
other states, and so the normative content of Realism is incomplete.   
 
Generally the Realists say that the international order is essentially anarchic, 
International Law is auto-interpretive with remedies lying in self-help, and states 
are constantly preparing for war.7 The movement was especially strong after World 
War II and during the Cold War, though it had no explanation for the peaceful 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union. International courts, like international law 
itself, are unable to restrain the exercise of state power but rather reflect it.  
 
Liberal Institutionalist images of International Law 
 
These theorists tend to agree with the Realist image of states as rational 
maximisers of self-interest but say that there is more going on than this – that this 
image does not take sufficient account of the co-operative behaviours of states as 
influenced by international institutions. It includes notions of regime theory 
wherein institutional norms and rules evolve out of given subject matter areas such 
as human rights, climate change, trade, etc.. Law clarifies and stabilizes 
expectations and reduces the risk of defections.  
 
Thus as well as looking to state actors this theory looks as well to their institutional 
contexts as significantly determining behaviour. It includes principles of state 
consent, and of states in turn deriving legitimacy from the consent of their citizens. 
Domestic political structures are important in explaining state behaviour, 
particularly in the empirical observation that seems to bear out Kant’s prediction 
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that republican (ie representative) or liberal democratic states would not wage war 
with other as their citizens would not permit it.8  
 
Slaughter’s re-conception of a ‘new world order’ 
 
Slaughter and others (eg Teson …) go behind the images of states and institutional 
contexts to the individuals and privately constituted groups who increasingly shape 
International Law and International Relations. There is a move away from a state-
centered account to one that sees governments as representative of various 
segments of domestic society whose interests determine state policy. Historical 
conceptions of statehood and sovereign equality are impediments to the dynamic 
which drives the ‘real’ world of transnational networks.9 Domestic ‘politics’ 
become the focus. The primary actors are individuals and groups acting 
domestically and transnationally in dense transgovernmental networks. Examples 
include the technocratic and epistemic communities animating climate change 
policy, or transnational frameworks of criminal law for the control of drug 
trafficking and terrorism, securities regulation, banking and insurance supervision 
(a favourite example being the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision)10.  
 
The new order she postulates is one of sub-state actors – legislative, judicial, 
regulatory, bureaucratic, private – whose persuasive (‘soft power’) discourses 
shape international relations and international law in effectively nationalizing 
international law.  Legal actors – legislators, judges, regulators – are of particular 
importance. She looks to the ‘disaggregated’ state which lies behind the ‘veil of 
sovereignty’. Between liberal sates these disaggregated components will interrelate 
in dense networks. Of particular significance for her is the evolution of a 
transnational legal order – ‘a network of municipal courts applying a complex 
array of domestic and transnational laws, legitimised by their democratic origins, 
with global implications’.11 Where consistency in interpretation and application are 
required, for example in respect of treaties, a supranational court would ideally be 
established. She cites the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights as paradigmatic examples.  
 
But generally domestic courts will be more important than international courts and 
tribunals in regulating and enforcing a transnational law informed by common 
issues and their resolution in other liberal democracies. There will be horizontal 
dialogue between municipal courts and vertical dialogue with supranational courts. 
In this scepticism toward the ability of international courts to deal effectively with 
                                                 
8 Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’ was to depend on states having a ‘republican’ constitution, the presence of a ‘pacific 
federation’among states, and extensive ‘international commerce’ underpinned by ‘cosmopolitan law’, said by some 
to approximate the modern liberal democratic state (Marks, supra note 12 [?] below at 464). 
9 Koskienniemi, supra note XXX at 33. 
10 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The real new world order” (1997) Foreign Affairs 5. 
11 Ibid. at 3. 
politically charged issues she has something in common with Realists like 
Morgenthau.   
 
Slaughter does not articulate any explicitly normative content to this new order, 
but it is clearly animated by a liberal democratic ideology and ultimately premised 
on, and legitimated by, faith in a Kantian peace, wherein liberal states do not wage 
war with each other. She defines liberal democracies in terms of their institutional 
arrangements as including: 
• Some form of representative democracy secured by the separation of 
powers 
• Constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights  
• An independent judiciary dedicated to the rule of law 
• A market economy based on private property rights  
 
 She is hostile to utopian ambitions of ‘world government’, or a liberal 
internationalist ideal, on both practical grounds (irreconcilably different values and 
cultures) and normative grounds (threats to individual liberty). The ambition is 
toward global governance, not global government. But she is anti-pluralist in 
postulating a liberal democratic world order, postulating a world of liberal 
universalism rather than one of realist difference and its associated risks of war.12  
 
(Examples: Neil’s transnational criminal law (drugs, terrorism). Climate change 
(driven initially by networks of scientists?)  
 
Globalisation ‘…state sovereignty has been parcelled both upwards (to 
international institutions such the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions) and 
downwards (to market actors and NGO’s)’13 
Liberal democracy a product of modernity …secular, democratic ideals, 
liberty, rule of law,  
Postmodern? …freewheeling, loose-jointed, always tentative/ ad hoc / 
contextual [?] …though still infused with grand narrative / deep structure of 
liberalism) 
 
With respect to the usefulness of Slaughter’s model, we can say that  
• It takes account of the complexity and multi-level nature of transnational 
and international interactions ie it is a useful descriptive and predictive 
account incorporating flexible and decentralized options (it is dynamic) and 
both high and low politics. International Law and International Relations are 
portrayed as polycentric. 
• It incorporates and gives substance to globalising influences such as 
communications technologies, cultural practices, a new cosmopolitanism, 
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though the impacts of globalisation are already being incorporated into the 
international order and international law 
• It offers a transformative agenda for international relations, albeit a 
totalising one grounded in a particular liberal democratic conception of 
culture 
 
Critique of Slaughter  
 
There are variety of fairly obvious critiques of Slaughter’s model of a new world 
order. For example: 
• It is not necessarily empirically accurate14 eg it arguably exaggerates the 
level of cooperation and harmony between liberal states (eg US 
unilateralism) and understates cooperation with illiberal states. It assumes 
that consensus rather than conflict will emerge. (NZ example re reluctance 
of courts to incorporate native rights jurisprudence from Canada; willingness 
to breach commitments under Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination …simply pick and choose what suits political agenda) 
• It is internally inconsistent, for example in risking illiberal outcomes 
whereby communities no longer control their own legal systems and where 
there is no consensus as to the common good ie is undemocratic! 
• There is a more obvious democratic deficit in the nature of the transnational 
networks themselves. They may occasionally be legislators but more often 
regulators, judges and private groups and individuals who at best are one 
remove from representative government and more often not even that. It 
might be more accurate to characterise the policy influence of such groups 
as mere interest-group liberalism15 with elected governments at best doing 
unprincipled mediation of the self-interested demands of contesting groups. 
• Loss of accountability, transparency and checks and balance with respect to 
domestic courts 
• Her model (disingenuously) eschews normative theory but it implies 
totalising, universalising assumptions about the superiority of liberal 
democratic cultures, including for example controversial issues like free 
market economies. By implication it marginalises ‘illiberal’ states.16 She 
assumes the triumph of liberal democracy in a ‘market place of ideas’, 
ignoring the role of power inequalities. Her model is teleological, with 
history moving toward modernist values of rationality and freedom.17 
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• It also assumes too much homogeneity among liberal democracies. For 
example, New Zealand does not have constitutionally entrenched individual 
rights, but tends toward a utilitarian rather than a Kantian liberalism. The 
forms of liberalism are themselves contestable. As with above, her model is 
implicitly ‘anti-pluralist’.18  
• It is very ‘messy’. It has no explicit motivating ideology other than a crudely 
implied liberalism, few mechanisms for the pursuit of consistency in both 
procedural and substantive norms, and in all likelihood unstable. Its ad hoc 
networking has a satisfying postmodern resonance but given the stakes in 
international relations that may not be enough – market places (of ideas and 
commodities) offer no assurance of appropriate or even desirable outcomes, 
particularly if power rather than ‘merit’ continues to dominate. 
• Koskienniemi: calls for an interdisciplinary integration (with international 
relations) mean a shift away from formalism (and an embrace of sociology 
and ethics) which dilutes the international lawyer’s motivating enquiries as 
to what is ‘valid’ law …” …[it] leads lawyers to contemplate an agenda that 
is posed to them by an academic intelligentsia that has been thoroughly 
committed to smoothening the paths of the hegemon”.19 
 
Summary 
 
Slaughter’s conception of a ‘new world order’ seeks to articulate a new 
‘transnational space’, a ‘cluster of disaggregated, liberal states’20 for the integration 
of international law and international relations. International Law has arguably 
been marginalised and under-theorized by its relegation to the role of an 
afterthought to International Relations and its commitment to Realism in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The concern, however, is that its motivating 
spirit of liberal democracy will serve to shift those discourses closer to the 
hegemonic influence of the United States through its ability to generate consensus 
on shared beliefs but underwritten by power. The risk is of ‘just wars’ and ‘neo-
colonial adventures’21 (such as Iraq). 
 
‘…a call to increase ‘collaboration’ between international lawyers and 
international relations theorists, together with the sociology of the end-of-
State (as we know it) and the political enthusiasm about the spread of 
liberalism, constitutes an academic project that cannot but buttress the 
justification of American hegemony in the world’. 
Martii Koskienniemi, “Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the 
Image of Law in International Relations” in Michael Byers (ed) 
The Role of Law in International Politics (OUP, 2000) 17, 30. 
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